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Abstract
In this paper, I study the role of the leverage ratio and its impact on investing in tangible and intangible goods.
The results confirm the hypotheses outlined in the introduction. Specifically, the results show that when
accounting for differences in the leverage ratio between firms, investment is cyclical. However, when looking
only at firms with low leverages, intangible investing becomes countercyclical. Moreover, during recessions,
firms with lower leverages tend to invest more than firms with higher leverages. Finally, the results argue for
the existence of financial frictions between investing in tangibles and intangibles.
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1. Introduction 
  
Firms generally have more disposable income when the economy is doing well. 
On the other hand, firms have less disposable income when the economy isn’t 
doing well. This effect has a pronounced impact on how investment changes 
throughout the business cycle; this change, however, tends to be different for 
tangible and intangible investment. This paper examines the role of financial 
frictions and the leverage ratio in determining these heterogeneous changes in 
investment decisions. 
  
During economic contractions, or recessions, there are two major types of 
theories as to how firms invest: cyclical and countercyclical. In a perfect credit 
market, investment is dictated by the opportunity cost approach, a counter cyclical 
theory of investing, which states that firms will know that the economy will 
eventually get better. Thus, firms will be inclined to invest more during a 
recession when prices are lower, allowing them to collect large profits once the 
economy has improved. However, when credit constraints get too tight, this 
investment channel becomes cyclical.  Firms facing tight credit constraints in a 
recession will have less money for non essential transactions, such as investing, 
and could instead choose to save that money or spend it elsewhere1.  
  
The graph below shows the percent change data for both the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and the Federal Funds Rate. While the level of the GDP  
percent change is often higher or more positive than the level of the Federal Funds 
Rate change, the differences are still highly correlated. The rate of change for 
both functions is often quite similar; when one function is increasing or 
decreasing, the other function is likely doing the same. This correlation occurs 
when the Federal Reserve adjusts the Federal Funds Rate to either create or 
reduce growth in  the economy. When the economy is in a recession, the Fed tries 
to create growth by setting a low federal funds rate and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
1
 See Aghion, Philippe, et al. (2010) 
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Figure 1: GDP and Federal Funds Rate Growth Graphs 
 
 
Notes: The data is from the St. Louis FRED Database. The data was compiled and graphed using 
Stata. GDP data outlined is in percentage change units and the Federal Funds Rate Data is just 
change.  
  
 The following graphs show the changes in the yearly averages for tangible 
and intangible investing.  
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Figure 2: Investment Graphs 
 
  
Notes: Data is from Compustat annual and the graph was created using Stata. Tangible investing 
was calculated and normalized by dividing capital expenditures by the previous years net property 
plant and equipment. Intangible investing was calculated and normalized by dividing SG&A by 
the previous years assets. The data was trimmed by using values that were in the 0.5 to 99.5 
percentile range for each measure to exclude any outliers. 
 
When looking at the graphs of tangible and intangible investments over 
the years, it appears to be procyclical to changes in the economy2.   Yet, this is 
without taking a firm's ability to borrow money and the leverage ratio into 
consideration. This distinction is particularly important when accounting for an 
inherent difference between tangible and intangible investments -- the inability to 
acquire collateral. For example, if investors give money to a firm for an 
advertising campaign, an intangible investment, they don’t gain anything if the 
company fails. On the other hand, if they give money for a tangible investment 
like a new factory, the investor will at least get the factory if the company fails. 
Thus, investors are more inclined to to invest in tangible goods. This process is 
further exacerbated during recessions when people are more conservative with 
their money and collateral becomes a higher priority for investors. 
  
We theorize that for those who choose to continue to invest, the leverage 
ratio, the proportion of debts to assets, gives investors insight into a firm’s 
financials and likeliness to succeed. The leverage ratio, in the models, shows how 
much money a firm has borrowed in relation to its total assets. Thus, during 
recessions, firms with lower leverage ratios should actually be able to borrow 
more for investments when investors are fiscally conservative and are looking for 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix A 
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safer investments. Due to an inability to acquire collateral, we theorize that the 
leverage ratio will have more of an impact on investment decision for intangible 
investing when compared to tangible. 
  
We examine this connection between leverage and investment for four 
different types of investment: tangible, intangible, research and development, and 
advertising. The latter two are specific types of intangible investment. These four 
investment types are run through three different types of measures of the 
economy: GDP, Federal Funds Rate, and Industry Output. These three measures 
are endogenous, which means other variables could impact them and thus bias the 
study. For example, suppose a firm has an innovative product idea. In order to act 
on this idea, they will start borrowing and investing more, which leads to a higher 
leverage ratio. Essentially, they ignore a firm's investment opportunities which 
skews the models. For that reason, two more models were used. The first, the 
monetary policy shock (also referred to as the Federal Funds Rate shock) looks at 
shocks in the federal funds rate futures. The second, the policy news shocks, looks 
at the shocks in multiple futures. Using the shock data doesn’t run into this same 
issue. Imagine there are two companies that have the exact same idea. For 
whatever reason, Firm A borrowed a lot of money a few years back and thus has a 
high leverage, while Firm B has been very conservative with their borrowing and 
has a very low leverage. The shock data doesn’t have any endogeneity bias 
because firms will respond to the shock accordingly without any other variables 
interfering. Using these models allows us to see who ends up investing more 
money without the bias from the previous measures. Of course, theoretically, 
Firm B should invest more than Firm A. 
 
Given all this information, the hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
1. Firms with lower leverages will invest more than firms with higher 
leverages during a recession. 
2. Firms with low leverages will invest counter cyclically in intangibles, 
while firms with higher leverages will invest cyclically. 
3. There are financial friction present regarding tangible and intangible 
investing when accounting for leverage. 
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Related Literature: 
  
This paper relies heavily on the work completed in Ottonello & Winberry (2018), 
which shows that firms with low leverage are more responsive to monetary policy 
shocks. Specifically, that investment and shocks are inversely correlated, such 
that firms with low leverages invest more in capital stock than firms with higher 
leverages during a recession. This paper expands on this aspect by looking at 
different types of investment. 
  
Regarding actual intangible investments, Lopez-Garcila et al. (2012) 
shows that with little to no credit constraints, a firm's R&D investments tend to be 
countercyclical. However, at a certain point when credit constraints become too 
tight, R&D investments will actually be cyclical. Although this variable is not 
leverage, leverage and credit constraints tend to be highly correlated. Both high 
credit constraints and leverage ratios mean that a firm will generally invest less 
and be more cautious while the opposite is true for the low end of the variables. In 
fact, a high leverage can be a type of credit constraint in and of itself, because 
investors are less likely to give credit to a firm that has a lot of debt. Aghion et al. 
(2005) show that this relationship is true for long term investment in general, 
which is what a significant portion of intangible investing is.  
 
The shock data was obtained using values calculated in Nakamura & 
Steinsson (2018). They calculate the shocks to the federal funds rate futures and 
other futures that occur in the 30 minutes surrounding an announcement by the 
Federal Reserve regarding monetary policy. 
2. Data Description 
The Variables 
Measures of the Economy: 
  
To determine the effects of a change in the leverage ratio, a models was run for 
each of the five different economy measures: Gross Domestic Product, Federal 
5
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Funds Rate, Industry Output, Federal Funds Rate Shocks, and Policy News 
Shocks. The GDP and Industry Output variables are growth rates measured in 
percentage change points, while the Federal Funds Rate variable corresponds to 
the change. The GDP and Federal Funds Rate data was taken from the databases 
of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FRED) and the 
industry output data was taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The GDP and Industry Output values are growth rates rather than measures of 
level, so it is not skewed and thus, does not need to be logged. The industries for 
the industry output data were determined by the firm’s North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) code3. The values for the Federal Funds Rate 
Shocks and the Policy News shocks were obtained from Nakamura (2018) and the 
time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks in a given period, as 
was done in Wong (2015). A positive shock corresponds to lower interest rates, 
which means the expansionary policy is being used and is thus correlated with 
recessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See Appendix B for specifics about classification 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Economy Measures 
 
 
GDP % 
Change 
 
FFR 
Change 
 
Industry 
Output % 
Change 
FFR Shock  
 
PNS 
Shocks 
mean 6.461416  -.3548571  1.600575 -.1082817 -.0009557 
median 5.949645 -.03   6.760336 -.0322377 .0429941  
std 3.22188  1.634106  1.95  .2150766 .178694 
min -2.037206 -4.119999 -22.1  -.8558841 -.6396713 
max 15.69019    3.02   20.2 .2072204 .1857514   
Years: 1980-2016 1980-2016 1980-2016 1995-2013 1995-2013 
Note: GDP and Federal Funds Rate data was taken from the St. Louis FRED Database. Industry 
Output data was taken from the BEA and was assigned to firms by NAICS codes. Shock data was 
acquired from Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks 
in a given period, as was done in Wong (2015) 
Firm Level Variables:  
 
All the firm level variables were acquired from compustat annual data, a panel 
dataset consisting of firm level data for all publicly listed firms. Having a panel 
dataset allowed the models to account for variation within each firm. Annual data 
was used rather than quarterly because the intangible investment data is more 
populated. 
 
         The firm level variables in this study were the different types of 
investment and the leverage ratio. For the following sentences, the letters in the 
parenthesis next to the variables are the corresponding variable names in 
compustat. The tangible investment variable was normalized by dividing capital 
expenditures (capxv) by the property, plants and equipment (ppent) from the year 
before. The intangible investment variable was normalized by dividing the 
Selling, General, and Administrative expenses (xsga) by the total assets (at) from 
the previous year. The Research and Development investment variable was 
7
Mauskar: The Impact of Leverage on Intangible and Tangible Investing
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
  
 
normalized by dividing its own variable (xrd) by the total assets (at) from the 
previous year, as was advertising. These calculations make the investment types 
into percentage units.  
          
         The debt, which is in the numerator of the leverage ratio, was calculated 
by summing the total long term debt (dltt) and the debt in current liabilities (dlc). 
This, in turn, was divided by the total assets (at) to get the leverage ratio. The 
leverage in the models is lagged, because it is the leverage of the previous year 
which determines investing for the current year. 
  
         Firms with a negative value for total assets (at) and property, plants and 
equipment (ppent) were ignored in this study, as these firms skew the results by 
having negative leverages. Furthermore, the first three models used data for firms 
from 1980 until 2016, and the last two models used 1995 until 2013. The last 
model used data from 1995 to 2013 because that was the only data available. Data 
from other dates was not used. Furthermore, observations that were not within the 
0.5 to 99.5 percentile range were excluded to prevent outliers from skewing the 
results. 
 
The Models: 
 
This paper uses 5 models -- 1 for each measure of the economy -- and is run for 
each of the investing types for a total of 20 regressions.  
 
The simple model is as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑖𝑡−1Δ𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡  refers to the different types of investing, 𝑓𝑖 is the firm fixed effect for firm i, 𝑔𝑡 is the 
year fixed effect in year t, 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 is the leverage variable for firm i in the year prior to t, Δ𝐸𝑡  is the 
economy quantifier for year t, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual. 
 
 The five economy quantifiers are GDP Percent Change, Federal Funds 
Rate Change, Industry Output Percent Change, Monetary Policy Shock, and 
Policy News Shock. Each model accounted for a different economy quantifier and 
was run for each of the different investment types: tangible investing, intangible 
investing, research and development, and advertising. 
8
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/1
  
 
 
The coefficient of interest in this model is 𝛽2, which shows the effect of 
changes in the economy on investing as a whole when accounting for leverage. 
The firm fixed effects captures the variations that occur within each firm, such as 
the individual investment strategies that each firm has. The year fixed effects 
accounts for variations that occur within each fiscal year. 
 
 For all subsequent paneled tables, Panel A corresponds with GDP Percent 
Change, Panel B corresponds with Federal Funds Rate Change, Panel C 
corresponds with Industry Output Percent Change, Panel D corresponds with 
Monetary Policy Shock, and Panel E corresponds with Policy News Shock. 
Because the different investment types are the dependent variables and they are in 
percentage units, the coefficients will represent a percentage change in that 
investment type.  
 
3. Analysis of the Data 
 
Impact of Leverage on Investment During 
Recessions: 
 
In the models, the interaction variable between the leverage and economy 
quantifier describes the relationship between changes in the economy and 
investment spending for a constant level of leverage. For the first three models, a 
negative value for the economy variable corresponds to a recession. As stated 
earlier, we expect that firms with lower leverages would invest more during 
recession than firms with higher leverages. For this to be true, the coefficient 
would have to be positive. The data for the first three models outlined in the 
previous section is as follows: 
 
9
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Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The GDP and Federal Funds Rate data were acquired from the St. Louis 
FRED Database, and the Industry Output was acquired from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s which are not presented in this 
table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment will change on a percentage 
scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% increase in investment while a 
coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit increase in the independent 
variable. 
10
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/1
  
 
The data presented by these first three models is conflicting. In the first 
model, the coefficient of the interaction variable for tangible investments is 
negative while it is positive in the other two models. The opposite is true for 
intangible investing; the coefficient of the interaction variable of intangible 
investing is positive for the first model, but is negative in the other two.  None of 
the interaction variable coefficients in the second model are significant, but the 
same coefficients are significant in the other models. This inherent difference in 
the interaction variables is most likely due to the the endogeneity bias, which is 
why the last two models were run.  
 
In these models, a positive value for the shock corresponds to 
expansionary policy and recessions, which means that a negative value for the 
coefficient of the interaction variable is consistent with the hypothesis. The data 
for the two shock models is as follows: 
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Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The Monetary Policy and Policy News Shock data was acquired from 
Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks in a given 
period, as was done in Wong (2015). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s 
which are not presented in this table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment 
will change on a percentage scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% 
increase in investment while a coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit 
increase in the independent variable. 
 
 The results presented in these last two models are consistent. The 
interaction variables are negative for the different types of investment, indicating 
that there is a negative correlation between investment and leverage for a 
constant, positive shock. Thus, as leverage increases, investment decreases. This 
agrees with the hypothesis that during a recession, a firm with a higher leverage 
will see a greater decrease in investment than a firm with a low leverage. The 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/1
  
 
following table shows how the interaction variable and investment change for 
different percentiles of leverage: 
 
 
Note: Shock data was acquired from Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by 
summing up all the shocks in a given period, as was done in Wong (2015). These values were 
computed using the data from the regressions run to create Table 3. Each value can be interpreted 
as how much investment will change on a percentage scale. For example, a value of 1 corresponds 
to a 1% increase in investment while a value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit 
increase in the independent variable. 
 
 This table shows that as the level of leverage increases, the coefficient of 
the interaction variable decreases. This indicates that firms with higher leverages 
will invest less than firms with lower leverages.  
 
The differences in significance between advertising and the other 
investment types, however, may be attributed to a lack of data, rather than an 
absolute proof that advertising doesn’t share this relationship. There is 
significantly less advertising data than the other types of investment, which can be 
seen in Table 3. With more data points for advertising, the results might have 
been significant. 
 
The data regarding tangible investment agrees with the results published in 
Ottonello & Winberry (2018), despite using annual data. Notice, however, that the 
coefficients are larger for intangible investment than it is for tangible investment, 
despite the mean of tangible investment being similar in magnitude to intangible 
when ignoring outliers4. This indicates that the leverage ratio is more important 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix B 
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when investing in intangible investment, and thus also argues for the existence of 
financial frictions between tangible and intangible investments. 
 
Cyclicality: 
 
The data also argues that investment is cyclical when taking leverage into 
account. The following table demonstrates this relationship: 
 
 
Note:  Shock data was acquired from Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by 
summing up all the shocks in a given period, as was done in Wong (2015). These values were 
computed using the data from the regressions run to create Table 3 and plugging a leverage value 
of 1 and the shock level from the table. Each value can be interpreted as how much investment 
will change on a percentage scale. For example, a value of 1 corresponds to a 1% increase in 
investment while a value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit increase in the 
independent variable. 
 
 For all the investment types, notice that the coefficient is less during a 
recession than during boom, which indicates that investing is cyclical. 
 
 This shouldn’t be the case; both Aghion et al. (2005) and Lopez-Garcila et 
al. (2012) show that when accounting for credit constraints, firm investing is 
counter cyclical. Because credit constraints and the leverage ratio are highly 
correlated, it would seem that the cyclicality in this paper should be 
countercyclical. 
 
To see if the results in each paper can show consistent results, the models 
were rerun, but only included firms with low leverages. The following table 
contains the data for observations that are within the 1-25 percentile range:  
14
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Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The Monetary Policy and Policy News Shock data was acquired from 
Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks in a given 
period, as was done in Wong (2015). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s 
which are not presented in this table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment 
will change on a percentage scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% 
increase in investment while a coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit 
increase in the independent variable. Observations above the 25th percentile and below the first 
were ignored. The former is to ensure that only low leveraged firms were observed and the latter is 
to ensure no outliers. 
 
 These coefficients, when looking at different shock values, present the 
following results: 
 
15
Mauskar: The Impact of Leverage on Intangible and Tangible Investing
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
  
 
 
Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The Monetary Policy and Policy News Shock data was acquired from 
Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks in a given 
period, as was done in Wong (2015). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s 
which are not presented in this table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment 
will change on a percentage scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% 
increase in investment while a coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit 
increase in the independent variable. Observations above the 25th percentile and below the first 
were ignored. The former is to ensure that only low leveraged firms were observed and the latter is 
to ensure no outliers. 
 
Notice, that in Panel E and Panel D, intangible investing and R&D are 
both counter cyclical because the value invested is larger during a recession. This 
agrees with the other papers that have shown the following: firms with lower 
credit constraints do countercyclical investing, but when credit constraints get too 
tight, investing actually becomes cyclical. The data agrees with previous literature 
because low leverages and low credit constraints are highly correlated. Tangible 
investing is most likely cyclical even when looking at low leverages because more 
of it is short term whereas intangible investing tends to be more long term. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I looked to see if the cyclicality of investing changes when 
accounting for the leverage ratio. In addition, I was trying to display the existence 
of financial frictions between tangible and intangible investing. Finally, this paper 
looked to see how investing was impacted for different levels of the leverage 
ratio. 
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 The data from the last models without endogeneity bias show that when 
accounting for leverage in general, investing is cyclical. When looking only at 
firms with low leverages, however, intangible investing becomes countercyclical, 
which agrees with previous literature. Furthermore, the coefficient for tangible 
investments, while negative like that of intangible investments, is smaller, 
indicating the existence of financial frictions. During a recession, all the 
investment types see a larger decrease in firms with higher leverages than firms 
with lower leverages.  
  
While the research conducted confirmed all the stated hypotheses in this 
paper, for better and more conclusive evidence, a larger sample size would be 
necessary, especially for R&D and Advertising data. Moreover, compustat only 
contains data on publicly listed firms, which can lead to altered results. Public 
companies respond to different incentives than private firms, as they have to 
appease their investors. In order to see how leverage is truly connected to 
investing and the business cycle, data from both private and public companies is 
necessary.   
17
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Appendix A: Models Without 
Leverage 
The following regressions were run to see the behavior without leverage: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝛥𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡  refers to the different types of investing, 𝑓𝑖 is the firm fixed effect for firm i, 𝑔𝑡 is the 
year fixed effect in year t, Δ𝐸𝑡  is the economy quantifier for year t, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual. The 
four different invest types are tangible investing, intangible investing, research and development, 
and advertising. The five economy quantifiers are GDP Percent Change, Federal Funds Rate 
Change, Industry Output Percent Change, Monetary Policy Shock, and Policy News Shock. 
 
 
 
20
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/1
  
 
 
Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The GDP and Federal Funds Rate data were acquired from the St. Louis 
FRED Database, and the Industry Output was acquired from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s which are not presented in this 
table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment will change on a percentage 
scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% increase in investment while a 
coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit increase in the independent 
variable. 
 
 The data presented in this model shows the correlation between 
investment and economic measures when not taking leverage into account. The 
coefficients for each of the investment types in all the models are positive, which 
indicates that investing is cyclical. Thus, this data is saying when the economy 
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increases, so does investing and vice versa. The variables which measure 
economic strength here, however, potentially face endogeneity bias, which is why 
the following two models are run: 
 
  
Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. All variables in the regression are normalized as outlined in the data 
description section. The GDP and Federal Funds Rate data were acquired from the St. Louis 
FRED Database, and the Industry Output was acquired from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The regressions run also included time and firm dummy’s which are not presented in this 
table. Each coefficient can be interpreted as how much investment will change on a percentage 
scale. For example, a coefficient value of 1 corresponds to a 1% increase in investment while a 
coefficient value of -2 corresponds to a 2% decrease for a 1 unit increase in the independent 
variable for a 1 unit increase in the independent variable. To exclude outliers, this model excludes 
values for investing outside the 10-90th percentile range.  
 
 The data presented in this table agrees with the conclusions from the 
previous table. For the shock values, a negative shock value corresponds to an 
economic boom, which leads to the opposite signs between the tables. Therefore, 
the negative coefficients here indicate that investing is cyclical. 
 
 It may seem like the coefficients for the economic quantifier are too large; 
for example, a 1 unit increase in the PNS shock would decrease tangible 
investment by 197%. Of course, this isn’t possible because investment would then 
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become negative. However, because the PNS shock has a maximum value of 
.1857514 and the FFR shock has a maximum value of .2072204, the values are 
significantly below 100, making it plausible.  
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Appendix B: Variable Summary 
 
Calculations: 
 
The calculations presented below are using the variable names provided by 
compustat. 
 
Leverage = (dltt+dlc)/at 
Tangible Investment = capxv/l.ppent 
Intangible Investment = xsga/l.at 
R&D = xrd/l.at 
Advertising = xad/l.at 
 
Summary: 
 
Table B1: Summary Statistics of Model Variables 
 
 
Leverage 
 
Tangible 
Investment 
 
Intangible 
Investment 
R&D 
 
Advertising 
mean .3287075 45.72674 .4096417 .1399219 .0507688 
median .2556242 21.71297  .2504729 .0335306  .0136443 
std .3720434 90.66892 .6192981 .3603204 .1538803 
min 1.75e-06 .0002335 .0053627 0 0 
max 4.862596 1358.589 8.205387 5.669101 2.887392 
Note: All data is calculated from variables in Compustat. Values presented above represent the 
data for the 0.5 to 99.5 percentile range.  
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GDP  data was calculated using the percentage change data from the St. Louis 
FRED Database. 
 
Federal Funds Rate data was calculated using the level change data from the St. 
Louis FRED Database. 
 
The industry output data was calculated using the data provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The industries are as follows:  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (NAICS Code 11) 
Mining (NAICS Code 21) 
Utilities (NAICS Code 22) 
Construction (NAICS Code 23) 
Manufacturing (NAICS Code 31, 32, 33) 
Wholesale Trade (NAICS Code 42) 
Retail Trade (NAICS Code 44, 45) 
Transportation and Warehousing (NAICS Code 48, 49 (except 491)) 
Information (NAICS Code 51) 
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing (NAICS Code 52, 53) 
Professional and Business Services (NAICS Code 54, 55, 56) 
Educational services, health care, and social assistance (NAICS Code 6) 
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 
(NAICS Code 7) 
Other services, except Government (NAICS Code 81) 
 
The Shock data was obtained using values calculated in Nakamura and Steinsson 
(2018). 
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Table B2: Summary Statistics of Economy Measures 
 
 
GDP % 
Change 
 
FFR 
Change 
 
Industry 
Output % 
Change 
FFR Shock  
 
PNS 
Shocks 
mean 6.461416  -.3548571  1.600575 -.1082817 -.0009557 
median 5.949645 -.03   6.760336 -.0322377 .0429941  
std 3.22188  1.634106  1.95  .2150766 .178694 
min -2.037206 -4.119999 -22.1  -.8558841 -.6396713 
max 15.69019    3.02   20.2 .2072204 .1857514   
Years: 1980-2016 1980-2016 1980-2016 1995-2013 1995-2013 
Note: GDP and Federal Funds Rate data was taken from the St. Louis FRED Database. Industry 
Output data was taken from the BEA and was assigned to firms by NAICS codes. Shock data was 
acquired from Nakamura (2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks 
in a given period, as was done in Wong (2015) 
 
 
Appendix C: Comparison to Ottonello 
Winberry Models 
 
 We ran a similar model to the one done in Ottonello & Winberry (2018) to 
compare the results. Leverage, Intangible Investment, R&D, and Advertising 
were calculated as outlined in the data description section. The dependent variable 
used in their paper was the log of the change in the capital stock. The capital stock 
was calculated by setting the first value for a firm as the gross plant, property, and 
equipment (ppegt) and the following values were calculated using the change in 
net plant, property, and equipment (ppent). It is important to note, however, that 
the data used here is annual data while their paper used quarterly. 
 
 The following results were received: 
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Note: The standard errors are present in parentheses with the following: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 This table shows the clustered standard errors, where the clustering is done by the gvkey, or 
the firm’s identification code. The Monetary Policy Shock data was acquired from Nakamura 
(2018) and the time aggregation was done by summing up all the shocks in a given period, as was 
done in Wong (2015). Outliers were omitted and the regressions run also included time sector and 
firm dummy’s which are not presented in this table. The regression equation is as follows:  
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜖𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the investment (this is 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘 for the Ottonello Model), 𝑎𝑖is the firm fixed 
effect, 𝑎𝑠𝑡is the time sector fixed effect,  𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1is the leverage of the 
previous year, 𝜖𝑡𝑚is the federal funds rate shock, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡is the residual.  
 
 The first column contains the regression results when using the 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘 variable for tangible investment as was done in their paper. The coefficient 
of the interaction variable is negative here just as in the paper, but is less in 
magnitude (-0.79 in their paper vs -0.253 here). This is most likely due to 2 
reasons: the first being this is annual data rather than quarterly so there must be 
some level of discrepancy, and the second is the scale of the Federal Funds 
Shocks is different due to different calculation equations. However, because it 
shows the same relationship, this is not of significant consequence. Therefore, 
despite using annual data, the general results are the same for tangible investment 
and can be used effectively in this paper.  
 
 Their model was then run for the different types of intangible investing; 
the investig types are defined the same as in the rest of the paper. Similar to the 
earlier models in this paper, there is a negative coefficient for the interaction 
variables. Notice, however, that the coefficient for advertising investment is 
significant, which was not the case in the earlier models. This indicates that 
advertising is cyclical, and also that firms with lower leverages will invest more 
than firms with higher leverages during times of recessions.  
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 In order to stimulate as similar of a regression as possible to their paper, 
the following changes were made to the data: 
1. Leverage was normalized using the z score equation so that 
leverage values would now represent standard deviations from the 
mean 
2. Only observations that had investment within the 0.5 to 99.5th 
percentile range were included 
3. No observations with a leverage greater than 10 
4. No observation with a current assets to total assets ratio above 10 
or less than -10 
5. No observations with a sales growth rate of less than -1 
6. No observations from firms with less than 10 years of data 
 
 If a single value of ppent was missing, a linear approximation using the 
ppent from the year before and after estimated it’s value. However, if either the 
year before or year after value for ppent was also missing, there was no 
approximation and the observation was ignored. 
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